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The Hill-Burton Triangle: The
Authority of California to Regulate
Assurances
In 1946 Congress amended the Hospital Survey and Construction
Act' (hereinafter referred to as the Hill-Burton Act) in response to post-
World War II deficiencies in the supply and distribution of health care
facilities throughout the country.2 The Act provided supplemental fed-
eral funding for the construction of hospitals3 and was intended to be a
joint federal-state endeavor.4 State participation was conditioned upon
the establishment of a state plan for determining local needs for health
facilities.5 Before a state could recommend a facility for approval for
funding, the facility was required to give two assurances to the state.6
These assurances required the facility to deliver care to all members of
the area served and to make available a reasonable volume of care to
those unable to pay.7
Until 1979 the burden of enforcing compliance with the assurances
rested with the states.' In 1974 funding under the Hill-Burton Act
ceased9 and the National Health Planning and Resource Development
Act I (hereinafter referred to as NHPRD) was passed. NHPRD con-
tains the current federal regulatory authority for the Hill-Burton pro-
gram." In 1979 regulations were promulgated under NHPRD that
attempt to limit the scope of the states' involvement in the enforcement
1. Hill-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, §§601-635, 60 Stat. 1040, 1040-49 (1946) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§291-291o (1974) (also referred to as Title VI of the Public Health Services
Act).
2. See S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7842, 7863 [hereinafter cited as 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
3. 42 U.S.C. §291b (1974).
4. Id; See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS supra note 2, at 7842, 7859.
5. See 42 U.S.C. §291d(a)(4) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at
7842.
6. 42 U.S.C. §291(e)(1), (2) (1974); 42 C.F.R. §§53.61-53.63 (1947).
7. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e)(1), (2) (1974); 42 C.F.R. §§53.61-53.63 (1947).
8. Memo from S. Yockey Deputy Director, Department of Health to T. Warriner Deputy
Director, Legal Affairs, Sept. 29, 1974, Emergency Statement Concerning Regulations for "Un-
compensated Care" (copy on file at the Pacfic Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Yockey].
9. See S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1306, 1314; 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842.
10. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
§§1501-1640, 88 Stat. 2225, 2225-76 (1974) (also referred to as Title XVI of the Public Health
Services Act).
11. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842.
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of the assurances received by the states under the Hill-Burton Act.12
These regulations require the state to have an agreement with the Sec-
retary of the Federal Department of Health and Human Services (here-
inafter referred to as DHHS) authorizing the state to enforce the Hill-
Burton obligations.
13
During the summer of 1981, the California Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development (hereinafter referred to as OSHPD)
held public hearings concerning proposed regulations for the enforce-
ment of the Hill-Burton assurances of health facilities in California that
had received funding under the program. These proposals are more
stringent than current federal regulations. 14  Public comment on the
proposed regulations suggests that OSHPD lacks the authority to issue
regulations that have stricter compliance standards than those of the
federal government. 5
This comment will show that OSHPD has the authority to regulate
the enforcement of the Hill-Burton obligations by a standard stricter
than that required by the federal government. First, an examination
will be made of the historical background and legislative intent of the
applicable federal statutes and regulations as well as California's en-
abling act. The comment then will discuss the nature of the Hill-Bur-
ton program as a federal conditional appropriations program and the
effect of the federal government's promulgation of regulations after
funding has ceased. The comment will demonstrate that although the
federal government has the power to impair contracts through its gen-
eral spending power, exercise of this power to preclude the California
regulations in question is invalid under the tenth amendment. Finally,
an examination will be made of the proposed California regulations.
This examination will also show that the Supremacy Clause is no ob-
stacle to the implementation of California's program.
An historical perspective wil clarify the development of the current
12. See 42 C.F.R. §§124.512-124.607 (1979); Agreement Between the State of California and
the Office for Civil Rights, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Jan. 21,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Community Services Agreement] (copy on file at Pacic Law Journal);
Agreement Between the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the State
of California to Carry Out the Provisions of Title XVI of the Public Health Services Act (Jan. 19,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Uncompensated Care Agreement] (copy on file at Iacifc Law Journal).
Compare Community Services A~reement, supra (allowing California to issue decisions and cor-
rective action concerning complaints of noncompliance, and to appl y sanctions available under
the state's law) with Uncompensated Care Agreement, supra (requiring that OSHPD follow the
federal protocol explicitly concerning complaints of noncompliance).
13. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842.
14. Compare proposed changes to 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§91101-91229 (as amended Feb.
1982) (copy on file at the Pacfic Law Journal) with 42 C.F.Rt §§124.501-124.607 (1979).
15. See generally Comment, Office of the Regional Attorney of the Department of Health
and Human Services, California's Proposed Uncompensated Services Assurances Monitoring
Regulations (1981) (copy on file at the PacKfc Law Journal).
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federal regulatory scheme. This is necessary for the discussions of the
issues involved in the determination that California can promulgate
and enforce regulations containing a stricter standard for compliance
with the Hill-Burton assurances.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
An analysis of the historical background of the federal and state acts
and regulations will illustrate the reasons which lead to their enact-
ments. Although the objectives underlying the federal and state acts is
similar, there are differences. To clarify the distinctions, each act in-
volved in the administration of the Hill-Burton program will ,be ana-
lyzed separately.
4. The Hill-Burton Act
The Hill-Burton Act was the first manifestation of the federal gov-
ernment's interest in national health care planning. 16 The Act was an
apparent response to President Truman's call for legislation that would
ensure nationwide health care. 7 Hill-Burton was intended to be the
first part of an overall scheme to provide greater accessibility to a
broader scope of health care.
18
The Act was established as a joint federal-state program19 aimed at
inducing the states to assume the burden of the traditional state func-
tion of meeting the health needs of their residents. 20 Hill-Burton was
intended to stimulate the development of new or improved facilities for
health services by assisting the states in carrying out state programs for
the construction and modernization of hospitals. 2' This was to be ac-
complished through partial federal funding of construction by facilities
16. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842, 7845.
17. President Truman's Message to Congress, reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1143, 1147-1148 [hereinafter cited as 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
18. See 625 F.2d at 1334-35 (Pell, J., concurring and dissenting). The goals of the original
plan have been partially achieved through amendment of the act as new health needs became
apparent. See, e.g., Medical Facilities Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 83-482, 68 Stat.
461, 461-67 (1954) (provided the states with grants to assist with the construction of diagnostic,
out-patient, and rehabilitation facilities); Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendment, Pub. L.
No. 88-443, §§600-10, 621-25, 78 Stat. 447, 447-62 (1964) (authorized grants for long-term care
facilities); Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-296, 84 Stat. 337, 337-53 (1970) (providing assistance for neighborhood health centers and com-
prehensive health care facilities).
19. 42 U.S.C. §291(b) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842,
7859.
20. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 968 (4th Cir. 1963); Mulvi-
hill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See
generally 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842, 7859.
21. See generally 42 U.S.C. §291(a) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note
2, at 7842, 7859.
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meeting the criteria of the Act.22
1. Requirements for State Participation
Funding for construction of new hospitals was to be in accordance
with a state planning process.23 To participate in the program, a state
was required to: (1) determine its needs for additional health facili-
ties;24 (2) establish a state plan for construction based on the results of
these surveys;25 and, (3) obtain uncompensated care and community
services "assurances from facilities applying for Hill-Burton funding.26
2 Requirementsfor Funding of Health Facilities
Facilities that sought funding for construction projects applied to the
state.27 The state recommended applicants to the Surgeon General of
the United States for approval.2 Before recommendations were made
to the Surgeon General, facilities were required to give the state both
uncompensated care and community services assurances. 29 The un-
compensated care assurance requires that a reasonable volume of free
care be provided to persons unable to pay3° and its duration is twenty
years.3 1  The community services assurance requires that the facility
make its services available to "all persons residing in the area to be
served by that hospital. '3 2  The duration of this assurance is
indefinite.33
22. 42 U.S.C. §§291a, c, e (1974).
23. Id §291d.
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§291c(a), (e) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at
7482, 7859.
25. See 42 U.S.C. §291c(a), (e) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at
7482, 7859.
26. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974).
27. See generally id
28. See id
29. Id
30. Id ("There will be made available in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or
modernized a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefore,. . ."). See gener-
ally Corum v. Beth Israel Med. Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (the delegated
federal agency, for all practical purposes, determines "reasonable volume").
31. 42 C.F.R. §124.501(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (1979).
32. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e)(1) (1974); 42 C.F.R. §53.62 (1947) ("The facility or portion thereof to
be constructed or modernized will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial area
of the applicant").
33. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution generally requires that peo-
ple similarly situated be treated in a similar fashion. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONsTITuTIoNAL LAW, 520 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. State action exists because the
facilities received government funds. Termination of the community services assurances allows
the facilities to discriminate in the delivery of the care. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967-69 (4th Cir. 1963). For example, a facility could refuse to accept a Medi-
Cal beneficiary in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. A more detailed discussion of the
due process ramifications in discriminating against health care recipients is beyond the scope of
this comment.
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3. Current Status of the Contracts Created Under the
Hill-Burton Act
State participation in the federal program was predicated on the de-
velopment of a state plan for the construction of necessary facilities.
34
State approval for funding required that the applicant agree to deliver
care in accordance with the assurances.3 5  In consideration for these
actions the federal government allocated funds for the state to disburse
to facilities whose applications were approved by the Surgeon Gen-
eral.36 Nonfulfillment of one of these conditions by the facility or the
state results in state liability to the federal government.37
The federal government has fully performed its duty tq allocate
funds to the states and to approve applications for funding.38 Since
funding through the Hill-Burton program ended in 1974,39 the federal
government has no on-going or executory contracts.4 0 Further, Cali-
fornia's duty to establish a health plan for construction of facilities is
fulfilled.4' Health facilities that received funding under the Act ful-
filled their federal statutory obligations when they gave their assur-
ances to the state.4 2 Thus, the contract entered into by the federal
government is complete. The contracts between the state and the facili-
ties, however, remain executory because the obligations and assurances
continue to ran.4u Should there be a breach, the federal government
has a right of action against the state,44 and the state has a legal right to
enforce the promises made to it by the facilities.
45
The federal regulations do not affect California's ability to seek judi-
cial enforcement of the contracts between the state and the funded fa-
cilities.46 The importance of the effect of the 1979 federal regulations
lies in the impact they have on California's power to enforce the assur-
ances so that the state's purposes for joining the Hill-Burton program
are fulfilled.
34. See 42 U.S.C. §291d(a)(4) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at
7842.
35. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e)(1), (2) (1974).
36. Id
37. Id §291g.
38. See id §§291c(a), (e), 291d; 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842,
7859.
39. See S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1979), reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1306, 1314; see also 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842.
40. J. MunAY, CoNTRAcTs §6, at 10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MuRRAY] (an executory
contract is one in which the promises or a promise remains to be performed).
41. California State Plan for Health Facilities (codified in scattered sections of the California
Administrative Code).
42. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
43. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
44. See 42 U.S.C. §291g (1974).
45. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
46. See note 81 infra.
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B. The California Hill-Burton Act
The magnitude of the effect of the 1979 federal regulations on the
agreements between California and the facilities funded under the Act
is revealed by an examination of California's legislative purposes in
joining the Hill-Burton program. Close scrutiny of the state enabling
act indicates that California intended to-use the act as a vehicle for
furthering the interests of the state in protecting the public health.47
In 1947, one year after the Hill-Burton program was instituted, Cali-
fornia enacted its Hospital Survey and Construction Act.4  The act
enabled the state to participate jointly in the federal program49 while
simultaneously manifesting the state's agreement to abide by the fed-
eral requirements attached to the disbursement of funds under the Hill-
Burton Act.5 0 The state act also served as a declaration of the state's
police powers to protect the public health in the manner prescribed
under the state act. 2
California's authority to regulate and enforce the Hill-Burton assur-
ances is derived from the Hill-Burton Act itself;53 the legal rights the
state gained from the contractual duty owed to it by the applicant facil-
ities;54 and the reservation of the state's police power to protect the
public health." By placing the burden of enforcing the community
services and uncompensated care assurances on the state, the federal
regulations issued under the Hill-Burton Act recognized the state's re-
tained police power and its contractual right to performance of the duty
owed by the facilities that received Hill-Burton funding.5 6
Until 1979, in accordance with the contracts created under the Hill-
Burton Act, the federal government required California to enforce the
assurances given by the facilities that were funded under the pro-
gram.57 The federal regulations issued in 1979 require the state to ob-
tain federal authorization to enforce these assurances. This affects the
contractual agreements between the state and federal government, and,
47. Cal. Stats. 1947, c. 327, §1, at 881-82.
48. CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §2, 881, 882 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§430-
435.7).
49. CAL. STAT. 1947, c. 327, §1, at 881-82.
50. At the time California joined the program, the federal statutory and regulatory authority
in existence would have given California constructive notice of the conditions and burdens re-
quired of the state. Participation in the program indicates acceptance of these terms.
51. See CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §1 at 881-82, NOWA, supra note 33, at 389. ("ITihe 'police
power' encompasses the inherent right of state and local governments to enact legislation protect-
ing the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the people within their jurisdiction").
52. CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §1, at 881-82.
53. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974).
54. See MuRRAY, supra note 34, at 2-3.
55. CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §1, at 881-82.
56. See generally Yockey, supra note 8. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
57. See Yockey, supra note 8.
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consequently, the agreements between the state and the facilities
funded under the Act. Additionally, it affects the ability of the state to
protect the public health through the enforcement of the assurances re-
ceived from applicants for funding under the Hill-Burton Act. 8
C. The Federal Regulatory Scheme
The impact of the 1979 federal regulations on the authority of the
state to regulate and enforce the delivery of health care under the Hill-
Burton Act can be best understood by examining the change in the aim
of the federal regulations since 1947. This change is clarified by an
examination of the differences in the regulations themselves. A brief
exploration of the federal act authorizing the issuance of the 1979 fed-
eral regulations 9 is required to understand fully the differences be-
tween the federal regulations promulgated in 1979 and those previously
issued under the Hill-Burton Act.
Until recently, federal regulation has been directed at enforcing state
compliance with the criteria set forth as conditions to participation in
the Hill-Burton program.60 From 1947 to 1972 the federal regulations
prescribed the manner in which the states were to formulate plans, es-
tablish priorities, and determine compliance with the assurances that
they received from funded facilities.61 In 1972 regulations were
promulgated 2 which were aimed at defining the nature of the original
contract obligations.63 The level of free services constituting presump-
tive compliance with the uncompensated care obligation was clari-
fied;' the method for determining eligibility for these services was
clearly established;65 and the requirements for compliance with the
community services obligation were made uniform.6 These definitions
did not change the nature of the contractual obligations. Rather, they
58. The original agreement between California and the federal government required state
enforcement of the assurances. See 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974). The facilities funded under Hill-
Burton gave their assurances to California. See id Applications by the facilities were made under
the state and federal acts. The federal act delegated enforcement to the state. See id The state
act utilized the state's police power to protect the public health through the means afforded by the
Hill-Burton program. See CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §1, at 881-82). Requiring federal authoriza-
tion to enforce the obligations modifies the state's enforcement duties under the contracts with the
federal government and the facilities and limits California's assertion of its police power. Com-
pare 42 C.F.R. §§124.512, 124.607 (1979) with 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974) and CAL. STATS. 1947, c.
327, §1 at 881-82.
59. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 93-641, §§1501-
1640, 88 Stat. 2225, 2258, §1602 (1974); 42 U.S.C. §300o-I (1974) (repealed Oct. 1979).
60. See Yockey, supra note 8.
61. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§53.111-53.113 (1972); Id §§53.61-53.63 (1947).
62. 42 C.F.R. §§53.111-53.113 (1972).
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made uniform the standard of performance that constituted discharge
of the contractual duty owed under the assurances. 67
In 1974 the legislative authority for existing health planning ex-
pired.68 Six months later Congress passed the National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act.69 Unlike the Hill-Burton Act
and its progeny,70 this act is aimed at the development of a national
health planning policy,71 the reduction of burgeoning health care
costs, 72 and the promotion of health resources development geared to-
ward meeting the more chronic needs of a growing aging population.73
NHPRD provides the mechanism for federal funding in this area.74
The Act contains a grant of authority for enforcement of regulations
concerning the Hill-Burton obligations.71 In 1979, in response to a con-
gressional finding that the enforcement of these obligations was unsat-
isfactory,76 new regulations were issued.77 These regulations are aimed,
in part, at assuring the delivery of health care "within the contest [sic]
of sound planning. . . of health care services.- 78 To meet this goal, the
regulations call forfederal enforcement of the facilities' Hill-Burton as-
surances. 7 9 State authority to enforce the assurances given to it by fa-
cilities that received funding under the Hill-Burton Act is predicated
upon and determined by an agreement between the state and the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services. 0 These agree-
ments define the state's role in the enforcement process.8"
The original federal regulations regulated the state's obligation
under the Hill-Burton Act. The 1979 federal regulations purport to
regulate the facilities that were funded under the Hill-Burton Act. By
curtailing the state's authority to enforce the Hill-Burton assurances,
67. Compare 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974) with 42 C.F.R. §§53.111(d), (i), 53.113(d)(2) (1972).
68. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842.
69. Pub. L. No. 93-641, §§1501-1640, 88 Stats. 2225, 2225-76 (1974).
70. See notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra.
71. 42 U.S.C. §300k(b) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842
(The intention of the Act was to "assure the development of a national health planning policy and
of effective state health regulatory programs and area health planning programs").
72. H.R. REP. No. 190,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 1979, see 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
supra note 2, at 7842, 7843.
73. H.R. RP. No. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
74. See S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 1979, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1306, 1314.
75. Pub. L. No. 93-641 §1602, 88 Stat. 2225, 2258 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300o-1(6))
repealed Pub. L. No. 96-79, §202(a), 93 Stat. 593, 632 (1979); Pub. L. No. 93-641 §1612, 88 Stat.
2225, 2263 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300p-2(6)) repealed Pub. L. No. 96-79, §201(a), 93 Stat.
593, 630 (1979).
76. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842, 7900.
77. 42 C.F.R. §§124.501-124.607 (1979).
78. 44 Fed. Reg. 29372 (1979).
79. 42 C.F.R. §§124.501-124.607 (1979).
80. Id §§124.512, 124.607.
81. See Community Services Agreement, supra note 12; Uncompensated Care Agreement,
supra note 12.
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the current federal regulations modify the original contractual agree-
ment between the state and the federal government.82 This, in turn,
alters the agreements between the state and the facilities funded under
the Hill-Burton Act.3 Moreover, the federal regulations limit the
state's ability to protect the public health in the manner prescribed in
the state act.
In addition, the federal regulations limit the state's enforcement of
the Hill-Burton assurances in other ways. The next section discusses
the concepts of conditional appropriations and impairment of contracts
as limitation devices.
LIMITATIONS ON CALIFORNIA REGULATION OF THE ASSURANCES
OSHPD has the authority to promulgate regulations for the enforce-
ment of the uncompensated care and community services obligations 4
subject to limitations imposed by the federal government85 and the
United States Constitution.86 Although the protection of the public is
traditionally subject to the state's police power87 there are two circum-
stances that would limit California's power to regulate in the area of
public health. The state may be obligated to comply with the condi-
tions attached to a federal appropriations program"' and the federal
regulatory scheme may be a valid assertion of the federal government's
power to impair the contract between the state and the facilities. 89
82. Compare 42 C.F.R. §§124.501-124.607 with 42 U.S.C. §§291c(e)-291g and CAL. STATS.
1947, c. 327, §1 at 881-82. The original contract was embodied by California's act of joining the
program. This indicated California's agreement to accept the federal statutory requirements to
participation in the program. See note 49 supra, note 98 infra. One condition was state enforce-
ment of the assurances received from facilities. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974); Yockey, supra note 8.
Breach of this duty by the state gave the federal government the right to withhold funds from the
state. 42 U.S.C. §291g (1974).
83. The original contract between the state and the facility required the facility to give the
assurances to the state. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974). Thus, the state obtained a legal right to per-
formance. See MuRRAY, supra note 40, at 2-3 (The law of contracts is concerned with the fulfill-
ment of expectations induced by the promises voluntarily agreeing to perform or refrain from an
action in the future).
The state enabling act allows for the use of police power to protect the public health by the
means contained in the state act. See, CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §1 at 881-82. Thus, the state
retained the right to use the assurances as a means of protecting the public health. The state
vested its delegated agency with the power to regulate in order to meet these goals. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§431, 431.1(a)-(b). By limiting the state's enforcement power the federal regula-
tions interfere with the performance owed under this contract and place the state's right to en-
force, other than through judicial means, at the federal agency's discretion.
84. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§431, 431.1(a)-(b).
85. The federal government may induce the states to participate in a program but may not
coerce them. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1947); Montgomery County Md.
v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1246 (D. Md. 1978); Goodin v. State, ex rel Okla. Welfare
Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 583, 586 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
86. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
87. CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327, §1, at 881-82; NowA,, supra note 51, at 389.
88. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra.
89. See notes 107-111 and accompanying text infra.
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A. Hill-Burton as a Conditional Appropriations Program
Conditional appropriations or spending programs are those pro-
grams requiring the undertaking of certain acts as a condition to the
receipt of allocated funds.90 "[T]he federal government may impose
terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the states
shall be disbursed." 91 Usually it is the state that is noncompliant with
the conditions imposed by the funding criteria of conditional appropri-
ation programs.9" Since funding is no longer available under Hill-Bur-
ton, the state no longer has to receive the initial assurances by the
applicant. California remains compliant if it has a state plan that is
approved by the Secretary of DHHS. 93 The purpose of the current fed-
eral regulations is not to assure state compliance but to assurefacility
compliance. 94 This was a right obtained by the state under the Hill-
Burton Act and retained under the state's police power.95
Until 1979, the federal regulations recognized the right of the states
to enforce the assurances that they received. 96 Under the current fed-
eral regulations, however, the state's enforcement power is limited to
the scope of authority granted in the agreements made with DHHS.97
This limit on the assertion of the state's police power was not a condi-
tion to funding when California joined the program. Moreover, the
new condition is not being attached to funding as an inducement to the
state to join, but is being added to a completed program package that
does not have an opt-out clause.
States have the option of not participating in a conditional funding
program if the conditions imposed are felt to be too burdensome. 98
Moreover, opting out can occur at any time during the life of the pro-
90. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
91. 436 F. Supp. at 586.
92. See, eg., Arizona Dep't of Public Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 468-71 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972) (federal grant-in-aid program to states for assistance to needy
individuals and families; Arizona's plan deemed out of compliance); Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1947) (Hatch Act allowed withholding of federal funds
to a State Agency if one of its employees was employed in political management); Vermont v.
Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D. Vt. 1974) (state nonconformity with federal requirements
resulted in withholding of federal highway funds).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§291d(a)(4), (b) (1974).
94. See 42 C.F.R. §§124.512, 124.607 (1979). See text accompanying note 12 supra (discus-
sion on Agreements).
95. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 8, 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 12, 76-81 and accompanying text supra.
98. See, ag., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (federal funding under the
Maternity Act). The Court found no usurpation of state power since the state had accepted the
otion of participating in the program and the conditions being challenged. Id Montgomery
unty Md. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1247 (D. Md. 1978) (challenging the validity of
NHPRD as depriving the state of responsibility over local health services. The conditions vesting
control in the Health Systems Agency existed under the original Act).
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gram.99 In the specific context of the Hill-Burton Act, this means that if
the burden of the conditions were perceived by California to outweigh
the benefit that could be derived from the program from the outset,
California could have opted not to join the program. Presently, how-
ever, there can be no opting out of the program since the program is no
longer federally funded. Normally, if the new condition is not consid-
ered too burdensome, the state merely agrees to and abides by the con-
dition. California, however, cannot agree to this condition which limits
its enforcement power, because the beneficiaries have the right to seek
enforcement of the assurances. 100 A person seeking to compel comp-
liance first has to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking
judicial redress. 10 1 To do so will require that OSHPD's jurisdiction be
triggered by a complaint."02 If OSHPD agrees to the limitation con-
tained in the 1979 federal regulations, the courts will not assume juris-
diction over a complaint of noncompliance because to do so will by-
pass the federal statutory scheme for relief.0 3 Hence, OSHPD would
still be required to become involved in the enforcement process.
California's assertion of its right to enforce the Hill-Burton assur-
ances will result in the achievement of the purposes of both the federal
and state acts. Periodic assessment of facility compliance with the un-
compensated care and community services assurances will lessen com-
plaints of denial of care in violation of a facility's obligations to the
state and under the Hill-Burton Act.114 In addition, there will be
quicker resolution of complaints filed.'0 5 This in turn will decrease the
burden on the federal agency responsible for the enforcement of the
99. See general 262 U.S. at-; 449 F. Supp. at 1247.
100. Corom v. Beth Israel Med. Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Cook v. Ochs-
ner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603, 606 (E.D. La. 1970). Contra Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp.
883, 890 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
101. See 373 F. Supp. at 561 ("Mhe regulations make commencement of agency review
mandatory.... [P]Iaintiffs and the members of their class should ab initio seek relief from the
agency .... "). Id at 562; 42 U.S.C. §291d(a) (1974) (indicating that Congress has chosen the
state agencies to carry out the purposes of the Act).
102. See 373 F. Supp. at 561, 562; 42 U.S.C. §291d(a) (1974).
103. The federal regulations require the state to have authority to enforce the assurance. 42
C.F.R. §§124.512, 124.607 (1974). The Act itself requires state enforcement of these assurances.
See 42 U.S.C. §291g (1974). If OSHPD concedes to the limitation in the federal regulations, a
person denied care owed by a facility under the assurances will go to court for redress for the
harm suffered, and will be denied judicial relief because enforcement of the assurances was dele-
gated to the state agency under the Act. Unless the state agency is requested to provide relief and
refuses to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the courts will not assume jurisdiction over the
action because it entails by-passing the statutory scheme for relief. See Corum v. Beth Israel Med.
Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
104. The right to enforce the assurances is not limited to post hoe enforcement. See 42 U.S.C.
§291g (1974). Routine assessment can be part of the enforcement process. Assessments on a
periodic basis will reveal noncompliance even if no complaints have been received, thereby
preventing complaints of denial of care.
105. As the number of complaints decreases, the state agency will be able to deal with the ones
it does receive as they are made.
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Hill-Burton program by freeing up its time and energy for the purpose
originally intended under the Hill-Burton Act-enforcing state compli-
ance with the federal requirements for participation in the Hill-Burton
program. 106 Preventative enforcement through frequent routine investi-
gations and assessments of facility compliance with the Hill-Burton as-
surances and quick resolution of complaints filed against Hill-Burton
facilities will decrease the need for judicial redress for violations of
Hill-Burton obligations. Moreover, preventative enforcement by
OSHPD will promote the welfare of the beneficiaries of the Hill-Burton
program by promoting their health and well-being.
To summarize, the 1979 federal regulations are not aimed at ensur-
ing state compliance with the conditions of funding and appropriations.
Rather, they are an attempt to establish criteria limiting the state's right
to enforce the assurances. Because these criteria were not in existence
during the funding period of the program, California should not be
bound to the conditions set forth in the regulations. The state should
continue to be bound only by the conditions in existence throughout
the funding period. Although the present federal regulations are not a
valid assertion of the federal government's right to condition the terms
for receipt of money allotments under the Hill-Burton Act, the federal
regulations may properly limit the state's right to enforce Hill-Burton
assurances if they are a valid assertion of the federal government's
power to impair contract obligations.
B. Tenth Amendment Limitations to the Impairment of California's
Enforcement Power
The federal government has broad power to spend for the general
welfare. 10 7 Pursuant to this power, the government may impair con-
tracts.108 Nevertheless, there are limitations on the assertion of this
power that may invalidate the attempt of the 1979 regulations to limit
the state's right to regulate the enforcement of the facilities' assurances.
Traditionally, the tenth amendment 1 9 of the U.S. Constitution has
been viewed as a truism.'I" Nevertheless, since National League of Cit-
106. Yockey, supra note 8.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 ("The Congress Shall have Power to... provide for the...
general Welfare of the United States .... ").
108. In re Community Power & Light Co., 33 F. Supp. 901, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ("In the
exercise of its powers under the Constitution, Congress may properly enact legislation which has
the effect of impairing or even... existing contract .... ). The federal government's power to
impair contracts is subject to U.S. Const. Amend V requirement ofjust compensation for takings.
109. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively. . ....
110. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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ies v. Usery, 111 increased potential for limiting the application of fed-
eral statutes to the states exists in areas of traditional government
functions.1 2 Legislation by Congress or its delegated agents that pre-
vents the provision of certain traditional state services, "is constitution-
ally problematic . . . because it hinders and may even foreclose
attempts by states. . . to meet their citizens' legitimate expectations of
basic government services." 1 3
Upholding a federal regulatory scheme that precludes the state from
enforcing the assurances it received, thereby impairing the contract be-
tween the state and the facilities, would result in lost health care serv-
ices to the general population"1 and would necessitate arduous
attempts by the intended beneficiaries to seek enforcement and redress
through the government's administrative network.'1 5 By promoting sit-
uations in which some can afford medical care while others are denied
health care treatment, the federal regulations thus prevent California
from providing basic government services that protect the health and
well being of its residents.
To summarize, as a conditional spending program, Hill-Burton was
subject to congressional determination of the limitations and terms at-
tached to the disbursement of federal funds. The conditions to the
Hill-Burton program that are contained in the 1979 federal regulations
were not in existence at the time California joined the program, or dur-
ing the period funding was available under the Act. California, there-
fore, is not bound to the limitations contained in the 1979 federal
regulations. Further, the current federal regulations are an invalid
mechanism under the tenth amendment for the assertion of the federal
government's powers to impair contract obligations or to spend for the
general welfare, because they inhibit California's ability to provide ad-
equate health care for its citizens. Thus, the only means by which the
federal government could properly limit California's power to regulate
and enforce the Hill-Burton assurances under a state regulatory scheme
would be federal preemption of the field of health care access.
111. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
112. L. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1065-76 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Unraveling NationalLeague]. Traditional government functions are those functions that
serve the "legitimate claims that citizens may make on their government." Unraveling National
League, supra note 1076 n.42. But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17
(1976) (case was confined to the commerce clause).
113. Unraveling NationalLeaue, supra note 112, at 1076.
114. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
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PREEMPTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The current federal regulations do not expressly preclude the state
from regulating the enforcement of the Hill-Burton obligations. Nev-
ertheless, if the regulations imply a congressional intent to preempt the
field of health care access, the state would be unable to regulate the
assurances. Therefore, an analysis of federal preemption under the
Supremacy Clause"16 is necessary to determine whether California's
enforcement of the assurances has been preempted under the Hill-Bur-
ton Act or under NHPRD.
A. The Preemption Doctrine
Traditionally, the states were preempted from regulation of an activ-
ity if it was a matter touched upon by federal regulations or statutes,
117
or when a need existed for national uniformity in the field.' 8 An ex-
amination of the current federal regulations reveals that the federal
government has regulated access to health care through the assurances
by its regulatory enforcement of the Hill-Burton obligations.
Congress has not chosen to circumscribe its regulation. Hence, un-
less there is a need for local diversity of regulation of this area of health
care, the state will be preempted by the federal government under the
traditional analysis.
An argument can be made that health needs require diversity in reg-
ulation to meet the needs of individual communities. At best, a na-
tional plan for health care can only speculate about the unmet needs
and shortages that any given area in the country is facing. The current
federal regulations, however, leave little, if any, room for a local deter-
mination of whether health needs that could be met by delivery of care
in accordance with the Hill-Burton obligations are being met. Further-
more, the ability to use these obligations as a means of meeting health
needs rests almost exclusively with DHHS." 9 Thus, the pervasiveness
of the current federal formula 2 ' conceivably could preempt the state
according to the traditional doctrine.'
21
When, as here, a program is ajointfederal-state endeavor, the regula-
tions on the state and federal levels may overlap, resulting in frequent
116. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
117. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
118. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S.,(12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851).
119. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§124.501-124.607 (1979). See text accompanying note 12 supra
(discussion of Agreement); notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
120. 42 C.F.R. §§124.501-124.607 (1979).
121. The comprehensiveness of the regulations would give rise to the inference of a federal
intent to preempt the regulation of this area. See generally Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 451-53 (1960) (Douglas, J. dissenting). But see New York State Dep't of Social
Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414 (1973).
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preemption of the states by the federal government. Since this may not
be the intent of Congress, a dferent test is used to determine whether
preemption results from joint federal-state programs.12 2
B. Preemption Analysis in the Area of Joint Federal-State Programs
In Gibbons v. Ogden,"- the United States Supreme Court decided
that federal statutes preempt state law when state law conflicts with
federal law. When the state regulations are inextricably intertwined
with federal regulations, both acting on the same subject, the federal
laws are supreme.1 24 If the federal regulations are of a sufficiently com-
prehensive and complete nature, the states are precluded from regulat-
ing in the same subject area even in a manner that complements the
federal regulations.1 25 When this standard is met preemption of state
regulation of joint federal-state programs results.
To determine whether an area of joint endeavor has been preempted
by a federal regulatory scheme requires an evaluation of the purposes
of the federal and state statutes and regulations. 126 Once the legislative
intent for enacting the statutes is ascertained, it is necessary to deter-
mine if the laws conflict. 27 Absent a clear conflict, there must be a
manifested federal intent to preempt the field 28 the "intent" cannot be
inferred.' 2 9
1. Legislative Intent
The Hill-Burton Act was aimed at increasing access to health care by
partially funding the construction of new and modernized facilities,130
by requiring the recipients of the funds to provide a reasonable volume
of care to those unable to pay for it, and by providing care to all people
residing in the area to be served by the facility.1 ' The California Hos-
pital Survey and Construction Act also was a mechanism by which the
state declared its intention to protect the public health.132 This was to
122. 413 U.S. at 414.
123. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
124. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1940).
125. See id
126. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
127. See id
128. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-203 (1952) ("If Congress is authorized to act in a
field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was
intended to supercede the exercise of the power of the state . . . . The exercise of federal
supremacy is not lightly to be presumed").
129. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) ("IT]he teaching of
this Court's decision which enjoins seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulations
where none clearly exists"); 344 U.S. at 202-203; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
130. 42 U.S.C. §291b (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842, 7859.
131. 42 U.S.C. §291e(e)(1), (2) (1974); 42 C.F.R. §§53.61-53.63 (1947).
132. CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327 §1, at 881-82.
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be accomplished by the means. afforded by the assurances received
from facilities applying for Hill-Burton funds.
13
The federal regulations issued under the Hill-Burton Act were aimed
at enforcing the state's compliance with the requirements of the Act. 134
The federal regulations reflected congressional recognition of the state's
right to enforce the Hill-Burton assurances by placing the burden of
enforcement upon the states. NHPRD was aimed at reducing health
care costs and at the development of a national health planning pol-
icy.135 The federal regulations issued under NHPRD are aimed at en-
suring facility compliance with NHPRD and the Hill-Burton Act.
136
2. Determining if a Conflict Exists
Lacking a definitive yardstick to determine the presence of a conflict,
the courts have used various terminologies and factors.137 The conclu-
sion that a conflict exists, however, has rested on a finding that the state
scheme "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'138 State regulations that
do not frustrate the full effectiveness of the federal law or the exercise
of the federal power do not conflict with the federal law. 139 Addition-
ally, state regulations that are not detrimental to the purpose of the
federal law, or are facilitative of the federal intent, do not conflict.t
40
Therefore, the test to apply in a joint federal-state program is to first
determine the purpose of the statutes, then to determine whether the
laws conflict. If no conflict is found, an express congressional intent to
preempt is necessary to preclude state regulation. With an understand-
ing of the appropriate tests to apply, analysis can now be made to de-
termine whether California is preempted from regulating the
assurances of the Hill-Burton Act. To achieve this purpose, discussion
will focus on preemption by the Hill-Burton Act or NHPRD, since pre-
emption by either act will preclude California from promulgating
stricter standards than those of the federal government.
133. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
134. See Yockey, supra note 8.
135. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
136. See 42 C.F.R. §§124.501-124.607 (1979).
137. See, ag., New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414 (diver-
sity of operational set-ups in various states); Id at 421 (interpretation of the administering agency,
coordinate program); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445 (1960) (recogni-
tion by Congress of the purpose or goal being a local interest); id at 444 (comprehensiveness of
the federal scheme).
138. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (In Rlorida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), a unanimous bench accepted this test).
139. 402 U.S. at 652.
140. Id
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3. Preemption under the Hill-Burton Act
The purpose of the state statute is essentially the same as that of the
Hill-Burton Act.14 ' Both the state and federal acts were aimed at in-
creasing health facilities and by inference, accessibility to health
services.142
No conflict exists between the federal law or regulations promul-
gated thereunder and the state regulations issued in response to the
grant of authority contained in the state statute. The regulations issued
by the Surgeon General in 1947 were essentially a restatement of the
statutory language of the Hill-Burton Act.143  The 1972 regulations
were merely definitional in nature.'" Until 1979, the burden of regu-
lating the enforcement of the obligations rested with the state. 45 The
only possible way for there to be a conflict would be if the state took
action detrimental to its avowed aim of protecting the public health;
this characterization is clearly inapplicable to the California enforce-
ment scheme in question. Thus, it is necessary to determine if there is
alternatively an express congressional intent to preempt. Not only is
there no mention of an intent to preempt in the original Act or in the
congressional reports surrounding its passage, 46 but in actuality the
Act was intended to induce the states to assume the burdens involved
in providing adequate health care facilities.147 Therefore, if the state is
preempted in the regulation of the enforcement of the assurances, this
preemption must be found instead in NHPRD or the regulations
promulgated thereunder.
4. Preemption Under NHPRD
The purposes of NHPRD are to reduce health care costs and develop
a national health planning policy. 14 8 This purpose is different from
that of the Hill-Burton Act.149 Since NHPRD incorporates the federal
141. Compare 42 U.S.C. §291(a) (1974) and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note
2, at 7842, 7859 with CAL. STATs. 1947, c. 327 §1 at 881-82.
142. 42 U.S.C. §291(a) (1974), 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842,
7859; CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 327 §1 at 881-82.
143. Compare 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1974) with 42 C.F.R. §§53.61-53.63 (1947).
144. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
145. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1336 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., concurring
and dissenting).
146. See generally, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842; Note, Due
Processfor Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1469 (1979).
147. See Siikin v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959,968 (4th Cir. 1963); Mulvi-
hill v. Julie L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See
generally, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842, 7859.
148. 42 U.S.C. §300k(b) (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842
(The intention of the Act was to "assure the development of a national health planning policy and
of effective state health regulatory programs and area health planning programs").
149. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 968 (4th
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regulatory authority for the Hill-Burton program,' ° it is necessary to
determine if there is a conflict between the proposed state regulations
and the 1979 regulations issued under NHPRD' 51 recalling that state
regulations that are not detrimental to the purpose of federal law do
not conflict.
152
A comparison of a few of the federal regulations with the corre-
sponding proposed California regulations 53 will serve to show that the
proposed regulations are generally facilitative of the purposes of the
present federal regulatory scheme and the intent of the Hill-Burton
Act.
The Code of Federal Regulations allows an Hill-Burton facility to
"make up a deficit [of care owed under the assurance] at any time dur-
ing its period of obligation. . ." for uncompensated care. 5 4 The pro-
posed California regulations 55 would allow the make-up of a deficit
within five years although it is unclear whether this make-up would be
mandatory within the five year period. Assuming that it is mandatory,
this regulation will ensure that facilities make up their deficits. Fur-
thermore, the regulation in no way interferes with or is detrimental to
the federal purpose of compliance with the obligation to deliver free
care at a reasonable volume for each year that the obligation exists.
Another federal regulation states that:
[a] facility failing to meet its annual compliance level must adopt and
implement an affirmative action plan, unless the facility claims and
reports to the Secretary of DHHS that it was unable to provide un-
compensated care at the required level because of financial
inability.1
56
This regulation provides little guidance for two reasons. First, there is
no guideline for a determination of the basis for the claim of financial
inability. Second, it is unclear what course of action is to be taken if it
is later determined that the facility was financially able to meet its an-
nual compliance level. California's proposed regulation 15 7 requires a
facility claiming that its deficit was due to financial inability to submit
Cir. 1963); Mulvihill v. Julie L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See generally 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 7842, 7859.
150. 42 U.S.C. §300o-1(6) (1974) repealed Pub. L. No. 96-79, §202(a), 93 Stat. 632 (1979).
151. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
152. Id at 652.
153. 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§91101-91229 (as amended Feb. 1982) (copy on file at the Pacific
Law Journal).
154. 42 C.F.R. §124.503(b)(1) (1979).
155. Proposed change to 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §91139(a) (copy on file at the Pacfic Law
Journal).
156. 42 C.F.R. §124.504(a) (1979).
157. Proposed change to 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §99145(a) (copy on file at the Pacfc Law
Journal).
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an affirmative action plan if it is later determined that the facility was
financially able to provide the care. California's proposed change thus
remedies the vagueness of the federal regulation.
158
As a final example, the federal regulations require triennial submis-
sion of compliance reports.15 9 Proposed California regulation would
require annual compliance reporting.16 While this is a more stringent
requirement, it neither interferes with the ability of DHHS to obtain
triennial reports nor is it detrimental to the purpose of measuring com-
pliance levels through this reporting. Instead, it will assure that deficits
in compliance are remedied quickly, ensuring access to health care
through the assurances given by the facilities.
As indicated earlier, 6 ' absent a clear conflict between the state and
the federal laws, there must be a manifested Congressional intent to
preempt the field.' 62 The express intent of NHPRD was to "assure the
development of a national health planning policy and of effective state
health regulatory programs and area health planning programs."'
63
The federal regulations promulgated in 1979 thus manifest no intention
to preempt the states from enforcing the Hill-Burton assurances. Addi-
tionally, the regulations themselves "disclaim any intention to interfere
with enforcement programs established by the States under the State
"2164law ....
In sum, under the traditional preemption doctrine California proba-
bly is preempted from regulating the Hill-Burton assurances. Alterna-
tive analysis of California's proposed regulations as a component of a
joint federal-state endeavor, however, reveals that there is no conflict
between the federal and state laws or regulations and there is no clear
or manifest intent by the federal government to preempt the field of
access to health care. Therefore, California is not preempted from reg-
ulating the enforcement of the Hill-Burton assurances.
CONCLUSION
California's proposed regulations assert its continuing right to en-
force the performance of duties owed under the contracts created under
the Hill-Burton Act. The regulations express the intention of the state
to continue to exercise its police power for the protection of the public
158. Compare 42 C.F.R. §124.504(a) (1979) with proposed change to 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§99145(a).
159. 42 C.F.R. §§124.510, 124.605 (1979).
160. Proposed change to 22 CAL. ADMrN. CODE §91157(a).
161. See notes. 127-129 and accompanying text supra.
162. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842.
163. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 7842.
164. 42 C.F.1L §§124.510, 124.605 (1979).
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health. Conditions attached to Hill-Burton funding as contained in the
current federal regulations were not part of the funding criteria under
the Hill-Burton Act, and should not, therefore be used to limit Califor-
nia's regulatory and enforcement powers in this field.
The federal regulations issued in 1979 are a valid mechanism by
which to assert the federal government's power to spend for the general
welfare. Nevertheless, application of the regulations to the state is in-
valid under the tenth amendment to the extent that they prevent Cali-
fornia from providing adequate health care for its residents.
Finally, the assertion of state power promulgating regulations is not
in contravention of the Supremacy Clause. The proposed regulations
will enable the state to use the Hill-Burton assurances as a means of
ensuring greater health care access and delivery to residents of the
state. Resolution of complaints will be faster and ultimately the
number of complaints will decrease. This would have the important
effect of preventing harm from the denial of health care services. Ac-
cordingly, no conflict of state and federal regulations of this area is
indicated, negating any implications of federal preemption of Califor-
nia's legislation in this field.
Robin G. Merman
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